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An Ecumenical Matter?1 
James Lenman 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Ridge defends a form of hybrid expressivism where normative judgements are constituted by 
two elements, normative perspectives and representational beliefs that invoke standards our 
normative perspectives GHWHUPLQH+HWKLQNVWKLVYLHZZLOOHQDEOHKLPWRµRIIORDGORJLFDO
FRPSOH[LW\¶RQWRWKe latter, representational components of our judgements, thereby taming 
the Frege-Geach problem and conferring a dialectical advantage over non-hybidµSXUH¶ forms 
of expressivism. But this will only work if our normative perspectives are themselves 
consistent in ways that are resistant to such offloading. There are, moreover, serious problems 
with building normative perspectives into what we understand by moral judgement that 
appear best tamed by thinning out our understanding of them in ways that effectively collapse 
the ecumenical form of expressivism back into its purer cousin. The supposed dialectical 
advantage proves I argue, chimerical.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 I read an early draft of this to a conference at Sheffield on New Directions in Expressivism 
in August 2016. I am grateful to everyone who took part and contributed to the discussion 
there and especially to Mike Ridge for his comments both spoken at the time and written 
afterwards. I also have a particular debt to my students Lewis Brooks and Graham Bex-
Priestley for many highly instructive discussions of the subject matter of this paper and 
detailed comments on a near final draft. An anonymous referee supplied helpful comments on 
an even nearer one.  
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I have learned an awful lot from reading 0LNH5LGJH¶VImpassioned Belief2, a brilliant 
book, deeply learned and densely argued with a tenacity and thoroughness that would be 
exhausting in a less skilful writer but which his consistently lean and lucid style renders 
instead simply exhilarating. It is a book that richly deserves to be the subject of a great deal 
RIWKRXJKWDQGGLVFXVVLRQ6ROHW¶V 
Ridge kicks off by offering analytic accounts of some core terms characteristically 
used to make normative claims DOODSSHDOLQJWRWKHQRWLRQRIVWDQGDUGVVWDUWLQJZLWKµJRRG¶ 
7KHOLWHUDOPHDQLQJRIµJRRG¶LVDIXQFWLRQIURPFRQWH[WVRIXWWHUDQFHWRZKDWHYHU
would be highly ranked by any standard of a certain sort where the context gives the 
relevant sort.(26) 
µ2XJKW¶FRPHVQH[WZLWK5LGJHSURSRVLQJWKDWµRXJKWVHQWHQFHVVD\VRPHWKLQJOLNH 
Any standard of contextually specified kind S would, relative to a contextually 
specified set of background information or facts B, recommend X.(28) 
The same schema does servLFHIRUµPXVW¶KHWKLQNVLIZHVLPSO\VXEVWLWXWHµUHTXLUH¶IRU
µUHFRPPHQG¶2QµUHDVRQ¶ he proposes to understand : 
Fact F is a reason for agent A to do/believe/feel X in circumstances C. 
as: 
Fact F explains why any standard of a certain sort of doing/believing/feeling would 
DVVLJQSRVLWLYHZHLJKWWR$¶V doing/believing/feeling X.(36-37)3 
These, terms Ridge says, are characteristically used to make normative claims but 
they are not always so used. When they are used to make normative claims (or at least 
practically normative claims to which his discussion is confined(19)) we may spell out the 
reference to contextually specified standard as referring to any acceptable standard of 
practical reasoning. This is later finessed to refer to any acceptable ultimate standard, ruling 
out standards based on deeper or more fundamental standards.(116)  
That is the semantic account on offer here of these core terms and it is, so far as it 
goes, neutral about some larger questions of metaethics. For it is silent on quite how we 
VKRXOGXQGHUVWDQGµDFFHSWDEOH¶µ$FFHSWDEOH¶PLJKWIRUDOOZHKDYHOHDUQHGVRIDUGHQRWHD
non-natural property, or a natural one, or we might, like Ridge, favour an expressivist 
reading. But deciding which of these routes, if any, to take, is not a matter of doing more 
semantics but of turning to a different activity, meta-semantics, which explains why the 
things semantic theory says are true and what exactly they mean, in virtue of what things 
have the meanings semantics says they do and how we should understand such semantic 
FRQFHSWVDVµGHQRWDWLRQ¶DQGµH[WHQVLRQ¶(103) I am not really 100% clear that I understand 
ZKDWPRWLYDWHVWKLVGLYLVLRQRIODERXUDQGKRZLWZRUNV8QOLNHµGHQRWDWLRQ¶µDFFHSWDEOH¶
GRHVQ¶WVHHPWo be a semantic concept at all. But ,¶PDOVRQRWDWDOOVXUHPXFKWhat is 
philosophically urgent hangs on this. I carHPRUHDERXWZKHWKHU5LGJH¶VDFFRXQW of 
acceptability is credible than about how it is classified. 
                                                          
2
 Ridge 2014. All page references are to this unless I say otherwise.  
3
 I have not worded this quite as Ridge does. 
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So take the case of judging something, eating string say, good as an end. For Ridge 
this is to judge that eating string would be highly ranked as an end by any acceptable ultimate 
standard. But this judgement in turn is to be understood as constituted by two states of mind: 
A: A normative perspective. 
B: The belief that eating string would be highly ranked by any admissible standard of 
practical reasoning. 
:KHUHWKHZRUGµDGPLVVLEOH¶LQ%LVXQGHUVWRRGDVadverting to standards not ruled out by the 
perspective in A.(119)  
,W¶VSUHWW\LPSRUWDQWDWWKLVVWDJHWRJHWFOHDURQZKDWDQRUPDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHLV
Normative perspectives, Ridge writes, µinvolve broadly desire-like states but also constitute a 
perspective which the agent intuitively endorses¶ More precisely, a bit later, we get:  
µAn DJHQW¶VQRUPDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYHLVMXVWDVHWRIUHODWLYHO\VWDble self-governing policies 
about which standards to accept or reject.¶ This is still DWULIOHYDJXHVRPHWKLQJ,¶OO
come back to. For now the thing to get hold of is that B is a straightforwardly representational 
belief and A is not. This is what make this picture a form of hybrid or ecumenical 
expressivism, where normative judgements are not comprised simply of desire-like states 
(pure expressivism) or simply of representational beliefs (pure cognitivism) but of pairings of 
one of each of these.  
One major advertised attraction of this ecumenical turn is that is helps us to handle the 
Frege-Geach Problem by µoffloading logical complexity.¶ The Frege-Geach Problem is 
the problem of extending any expressivist account the meaning of normative terms to their 
role in complex sentences such as conditionals and negations in such a way as to make good 
sense of the role these sentences play in valid arguments. For pure expressivists this seems to 
QHFHVVLWDWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIµDORJLFRIDWWLWXGHV¶DSURMHFWWKDWKDVOHIWPDQ\VFHSWLFDO
But not so with the ecumenical version, Ridge urges. For the ecumenical expressivist the 
whole difficulty is µoffloaded¶ onto the representational belief component of our normative 
thoughts and thus becomes thoroughly manageable.  
So consider a case of moral modus ponens. 
Eating little bits of string is wrong. 
If eating little bits of string is wrong, supplying string to stringeaters is wrong. 
Therefore supplying string to stringeaters is wrong. 
What each of these sentences expresses, according to Ridge, breaks down into two bits, an 
expressive bit and a descriptive bit. But the nice thing is that the expressive bit is the same 
throughout. The descriptive bits say that eating little bits of string has the property in 
question, that if eating little bits of string has it, then supplying string to stringeaters has it 
and that supplying string to string eaters has it. These claims are all perfectly straightforward 
descriptive claims straightforwardly related in the usual way the premises and conclusion of a 
valid instance of modus ponens are. Now say we characterise validity as a matter of accepting 
both the premises and the negation of the conclusion guaranteeing that one will fall into 
inconsistency. Effectively the logical form of the argument is: 
X; P 
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X; If P then Q 
Therefore: X; Q. 
Where P and Q are ordinary descriptive claims. P and If P then Q together entail Q. Because 
;LVFRQVWDQWLWGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\PDWWHUZKDWLWLV,WMXVWLGOHVDORQJZLWKRXWFKDQJLQJRQWKH
left hand side. We can as it were divide through by it and let the descriptive side do all the 
work. 
$FWXDOO\,IHDUZHFDQ¶WWhatever X is, it better be logically tractable enough for 
iteration to be valid for it. X has to at least entail X. And that means we need a logic of 
attitudes after all. Of course iteration is a very trivial and simple logical principle. So while 
this story maybe does need to allow for some kind of logic of attitudes, that logic may look 
very modest and minimal. In particular, it might be supposed, because X only features in 
isolation4, ZHGRQ¶WQHHGWRVWUXJJOHWRXQGHUVWDQGLWHPEHGGHGHJLQFRQGLWLRQDOV. 
Nonetheless iteration is not minimal enough for us to solve the Frege-Geach Problem so very 
simply. For if we characterise validity in terms of contradiction between the premises and the 
negation of thHFRQFOXVLRQWKHYDOLGLW\RI;ş X will consist in the inconsistency of X and 
not-X. And for that we need to know what µnot-X¶ means. And explaining negation is right at 
the heart of the difficulty constituted by the Frege-Geach Problem. (After all we can in 
familiar ways define at least the material conditional, as well as disjunction, in terms of 
negation and conjunFWLRQDQGRIWKRVHWZRRSHUDWRUVFRQMXQFWLRQGRHVQ¶WSODXVLEO\ORRNOLNH
the hard one.) 
Ridge does not however think this is a problem. He denies that X by itself is any kind 
of judgement and so supposes there is no need to understand  iteration or any other logical 
rule as properly applicable to it.5 But that seems insufficient to the present concern:HGRQ¶W
just want the entailment relation to hold between P, If P then Q and Q. We want it to hold 
between X; P, X; If P then Q and X; Q. The reasoner surely has to adhere to X throughout on 
pain of inconsistency. But no, Ridge wants to say. As he understands validity:  
the crucial test is whether a single agent could, at one and the same time, accept the 
premises and deny the conclusion of the argument. Given that an agent can at any 
point in time have only one normative perspective, this ensures that the reference of 
µadmissible¶ is constant throughout the beliefs relevant to testing the validity of the 
relevant arguments.(152) 
It is important to stress here that our X here better not just be thought of as something off in 
the background somewhere whose only roOHLVWRIL[WKHUHIHUHQFHIRUµDGPLVVLEOH¶ in the 
representational component. That would be a possible view ± a kind of contexualism perhaps 
- but not an expressivist one. X is itself a constituent part of the judgements whose logical 
relations are under discussion. (See 118-123) For another thing it might not seem at all 
REYLRXVWKDWµan agent can at any point in time have onl\RQHQRUPDWLYHSHUVSHFWLYH¶. What 
might be more plausibly claimed is that a consistent agent can at a given point of time have 
only one normative perspective. But that of course brings the problem of accounting for 
normative consistency straight back home.     
                                                          
4
 2IFRXUVHLWGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\Vide infra. 
5
 Correspondence (29/10/2016). 
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Ridge sa\VPRUHWKDQWKLV+HJRHVRQµAn agent can at any given point in time have 
only one normative perspective because normative perspectives are just defined as the totality 
of the relevant sorts of emotionally tinged self-governing policieV¶But I am not at all sure 
that this helps. For one thing, as I already noted, the idea of normative perspectives is 
frustratingly vague, certainly vague enough that I am unclear quite how to unpDFNWDONRIµthe 
relevant sorts¶. For another, Ridge gives centre stage in his account of normative perspectives 
WRZKDWKHFDOOVµVHOI-JRYHUQLQJSROLFLHV¶ a concept he takes from Michael BratmaQ¶VZRUN
DQGKHDGRSWV%UDWPDQ¶s account of what these are, including the understanding of them as 
µsubject to strong demaQGVRIFRQVLVWHQF\DQGWKHOLNH¶.(115)  So we would want to hear 
more about what these demands come to. Might not the totality of my self-governing policies 
of the relevant sort itself be inconsistent? And what then? We want to explain the validity of 
our argument by diagnosing a case of modus ponens, not a case of ex falso quodlibet. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, normative perspectives had better be subject to some 
consistency constraints and not just because Bratman says so. Otherwise we have no reason 
to suppose and certainly cannot just help ourselves to the supposition, that those prosaically 
descriptive propositions that specify what such a perspective does and does not licence as 
DFFHSWDEOHPXVWWKHPVHOYHVEHFRQVLVWHQW6RZHUHDOO\FDQ¶WVLPSO\RIIORDGWKHHQWLUHLVVXH
of consistency and validity onto the latter.  
Here is a different, approximately Gibbardian, story.6 :KHQ,VD\µChewing little bits 
of VWULQJLVZURQJ¶ I express my acceptance of a system of norms specified by what I say only 
as not permitting chewing little bits of string. Or to exploit what Ridge call the power of 
negative thinking (111-113), I express a state of ruling out all such systems that permit 
chewing little bits of string. That would be a form of pure expressivism where my judgement 
that something is wrong is µidentified by its place in a syndrome of tendencies towards action 
and avowal; produced by the language-infused system of coordination peculiar to human 
beings.¶7  But though this is a form of pure expressivism we can think of normative terms 
VXFKDVµSHUPLWWHG¶µIRUELGGHQ¶UHTXLUHG¶DVKDYLQJdescriptive correlates in the systems of 
norms that inform this kind of Gibbardian normative semantics, N-permitted, N-forbidden, N-
required.8 From a logical point of view what matters is that the system of norms we suppose 
N to denote be invariant in a given context of logical evaluation. We can then construct for 
any normative sentence what we might call its descriptive transform (or D-transform) which 
is the sentence we arrive at by substituting for normative terms their descriptive correlates. 
Rather like this: 
Chewing little bits of string is N-forbidden. 
If chewing little bits of string is N-forbidden, supplying string to stringchewers is N-
forbidden. 
Therefore supplying string to stringchewers is N-forbidden. 
The pure expressivist can then say that the latter, the descriptive  transform of our normative 
argument, is straightforwardly valid in the way we are familiar with from other prosaically 
descriptive contexts. And they might go on to say that the original normative arguPHQW¶V
                                                          
6
 What follows is roughly based on what we find in Gibbard 1990.  
7
 Gibbard 1990, p. 75. 
8
 Cf. Gibbard 1990, p. 87. 
6 
 
validity can be understood as obtaining in virtue of the validity of its descriptive transform. 
At the same time the N-transform argument does no more than bring to the surface and make 
explicit a logical structure that is already present ± as we have seen had better be already 
present ± in the untransformed normative judgements. 
 Now this story as a solution to the Frege-Geach problem is obviously incomplete as it 
stands. An account is needed of this µin virtue of¶ relation and how it is supposed to work 
here. But compare Ridge, who in effect wants to tell us that: 
X; P 
X; If P then Q 
Therefore: X; Q. 
where X is a normative perspective is valid in virtue of the validity of  
P 
If P then Q 
Therefore: Q. 
Again if this is to work the normative perspective that lays down the standard of admissibility 
these thoughts make reference to must already be logically structured and constrained in the 
right way. 
The pure expressivist might say a normative argument is valid in favour of the 
validity of its D-transform.  But while the validity of the D-transform gets us from the 
SUHPLVHVWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQRIDQRUPDWLYHDUJXPHQW¶V'-transform, it does not get us from the 
premises of the original argument itself to that DUJXPHQW¶VFRQFOXVLRQ7RGRWKDWZHwould 
need an additional principle which we may call the N-principle: 
Validly infer the N-transform of the conclusion of anything that follows 
validly from the D-transform of some set of premises.  
An N-transform is the result of the converse operation to that which generates a D-transform. 
The N-principle will apply trivially when none of our premises is normative. But it is 
otherwise far from trivial.  Ridge would have made important progress if he had rid us of the 
QHHGIRUDQ\VXFKH[WUDVWHS%XWKHKDVQ¶WWe can allow that X; P and X; If P then Q 
together entail Q. But that is not to entail X; Q which they have to do. Whatever we think X 
is, it better be the sort of thing that when combined with something like Q can be the object 
of an entailment. And for X; P and X; If P then Q together to entail X; Q, it would have to be 
the case that inconsistency would be guaranteed to anyone who accepted the premises and 
denied the conclusion.  And to deny the conclusion would be to deny X; Q. This Ridge tells 
us that that is µin part¶ to deny Q.(152) But we need to know what it is to deny X; Q as a 
whole. And that is not clear. Indeed it is not clear that to deny X; Q is even in part to deny Q. 
After all in general to deny P & Q is not in part to deny Q. Rather it is to assert ~P v ~Q 
which is entirely consistent with Q. The problem of accounting for normative negation is part 
of what Ridge thinks he can offload, but, as is now clear, this seems very doubtful.  
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 ,WLVQRWFOHDUWKHQWKDW5LGJH¶VHFXPHQLFDOVWRU\KDVDclear dialectical advantage. 
And it seems to me to suffer from the unclarity of the notion of a normative perspective. One 
way to understand these is expansively, as a large normative theoretical pictures. Ridge 
sometimes encourages this understanding e.g. at p. 207 when he uses utilitarianism and 
Kantianism as examples of possible normative perspectives. But this is troubling. For one 
thing it risks making poor sense of normative disagreement When X says: 
Sex outside wedlock is wrong. 
And Y responds: 
Sex outside wedlock is not wrong. 
We take them to be disagreeing but if X is expressing (say) a utilitarian normative 
perspective coupled with a representational belief that no standard of practical reasoning 
acceptable in the light of that perspective would forbid extra-marital sex while Y is 
expressing (say) a conservative Christian natural law theoretic normative perspective coupled 
with a representational belief that no standard of practical reasoning acceptable in the light of 
that would allow extra-marital sex, they do rather look to be talking past one another. 
Secondly there is the possibility of theoretical agnosticism. Some philosophically  
XQVRSKLVWLFDWHGSHRSOHGRQ¶WEX\LQWRDQ\SDUWLFXODUODUJHQRUPDWLYHWKHRUHWLFDOSLFWXUH$QG
some philosophically very sophisticated people ± the anti-theorists - think they are right not 
to do so. But those people can and do have all manner of more particular normative opinions 
of which we want our metaethical theory to make good sense. Finally even if I am one of the  
theoretically opinionated users of normative language, a Kantian or a utilitarian or a natural 
law theorist or a whatever, that theoretical perspective very plausibly really has nothing to do 
with what I express when I say, for example that torturing criminal suspects is wrong. When I 
say that torturing criminal suspects is wrong I am committing myself on the wrongness of 
torturing criminal suspects and on nothing else and I am saying the very same thing as an act 
utilitarian or a Thomist or a Kantian would be saying by saying that torturing criminal 
suspects is wrong even though I am neither an act utilitarian nor a Thomist nor a Kantian. Of 
course I may have all manner of background commitments and attitudes but these are not any 
part of what I say.  
 
 Ridge might hope to tame at least the disagreement worry by plugging in his own 
account of disagreement which is the subject of chapter 6. Roughly, he thinks, X and Y 
disagree if µin circumstances of honesty, full candour and non-hypocrisy¶ they would give 
conflicting advice to relevantly circumstanced  agents.(187) So confronted with a pair of 
unwed would-be lovers in circumstances free of other ethically defeating considerations, X 
will say, 'RQ¶WGRLW While Y says, Feel free to do it!  Only, as Graham Bex-Priestley and 
Yonatan Shemmer observe, they might not. Perhaps X and Y agree in valuing autonomy. 
They think it important Romeo and Juliet make their own minds up what they should do and 
so both advise them the same way: Think very carefully about what the right thing is and act 
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accordingly. It is not at all obvious that the honesty, candour and non-hypocrisy conditions 
are going to iron this sort of worry out.9  
Ridge does address the second, agnosticism worry., more directly. In chapter 4 he 
distances himself from understanding DQDJHQW¶VQRUmative perspective as µher acceptance of 
any RYHUDUFKLQJQRUPDWLYHVWDQGDUG¶ Think of it rather as a kind of µwork in progress¶, 
something provisional and incomplete.(115) Indeed he explicitly considers the case of the 
PRUDODJQRVWLFVRPHRQHµdeeply agnostic about morality as a whole, and who therefore 
DFFHSWVQRPRUDOQRUPVDWDOO¶ This person might nonethelesVDFFHSWWKHFRQGLWLRQDOFODLPµif 
eating meat is morally wrong, then eating beef is PRUDOO\ZURQJ¶+HUHKHH[SODLQV
µEcumenical expressivism requires only that the speaker is committed to not accepting moral 
standards which simultaneously forbid eating meat but do not forbid HDWLQJEHHI¶10 So what 
this character is essentially doing, it would seem, is something along the lines of ruling out all 
normative outlooks which forbid eating meat and do not forbid eating beef. This very 
restrictive way of understanding the normative perspective in question is fine but it sounds 
striking like what Gibbard might say. If this person then comes to depart from their 
agnosticism just to the extent of deciding eating meat is indeed wrong, they might be taken 
also to rule out all normative outlooks that permit eating meat. Having now ruled out all 
normative outlooks that permit eating meat and ruled out all normative outlooks which forbid 
eating meat and do not forbid eating beef, they have neatly logically boxed themself in to 
ruling out all normative outlooks that do not forbid eating beef. And that is more or less 
exactly what Gibbard would say.  
Suppose we are thinking of this person as having a little toy normative outlook NO.  
NO: H! (Standards that forbid eating meat); H! (Standards that do not both forbid 
eating meat and fail to forbid eating beef)  
The passage of thought in moral modus ponens thus looks like this: 
IMPURE MP11 
NO: H! (Standards that forbid eating meat); H! (Standards that do not both forbid 
eating meat and fail to forbid eating beef)  
                                                          
9
 Bex-Priestley and Shemmer 2017.  In his Unpublished Bex-Priestley raises further very 
VHULRXVGLIILFXOWLHVIRU5LGJH¶VDFFRXQWRIGLVDJUHHPHQW 
10
 I have amended the published text which is clearly a slip, as Ridge confirms 
(correspondence 10/17KHVXEVWLWXWHGZRUGVµwhich forbid eating meat but do not 
IRUELGHDWLQJEHHI¶ are taken from a sentence later in the same paragraph where the desired 
idea is expressed as intended.   
11
 ImporWDQWQRWHµ+¶ here is a toy device we expressivists use from time to time when 
thinking at a vHU\DEVWUDFWOHYHODERXWKRZDµORJLFRIDWWLWXGHV¶ might work. In this context 
think of it as a place holder for whatever species of nonrepresentational commitment your 
favourite expressivist theory  accords central stage. Thus Ridge would unpack it in terms of 
self-governing policies of standard acceptance, for Gibbard (1990) a complex syndrome of 
norm acceptance or , in later writings (2003), some kind of planning state.  No one in this 
conversation is buying into the crude boo!-hurrah! theory of ethical language sometimes 
encountered in hostile caricature where what we do when we use normative language is boo 
and hurrah stuff .  
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Eating meat is NO-forbidden. 
NO: H! (Standards that forbid eating meat); H! (Standards that do not both forbid 
eating meat and fail to forbid eating beef)  
If eating meat is NO-forbidden, then eating beef is NO-forbidden.  
NO: H! (Standards that forbid eating meat); H! (Standards that do not both forbid 
eating beef and fail to forbid eating beef)  
Eating beef is NO-forbidden.  
A more pure expressivist story might go: 
PURE MP 
NA: H! (Standards that forbid eating meat);  
(Eating meat is NA-forbidden.) 
NB: H! (Standards that do not both forbid eating meat and fail to forbid eating beef)  
(If eating meat is NB-forbidden, then eating beef is NB-forbidden.)  
NC: H! (Standards that forbid eating beef) 
(Eating beef is NC-forbidden.)  
The purist will EUDFNHWWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOHOHPHQWV7KH\¶UHQRWSDUWRIWKHFRQWent of 
normative judgements which are wholly given by the nonrepresentational elements. All they 
do is describe the logical structure that is already present in the latter for which they offer 
what I have called descriptive transforms. But the same is true, had better be true, as we have 
seen, of the impure story.   
Another observation is important. In IMPURE MP the nonrepresentational element is the 
same at each step. In PURE MP it is not and we need it to be. We want, as we saw,  
something that yields as its descriptive transform: 
(Eating meat is N-forbidden.) 
(If eating meat is N-forbidden, then eating beef is N-forbidden.)  
(Eating beef is N-forbidden.)  
For some uniform N. But this does not look like a very difficult task. One way is to think of 
N as representing the totality of normative attitudes supposed true. (All prominent 
contemporary expressivists favouring as they do some quasi-realist strategy for bringing the 
concept of truth to bear on such things.) The representational elements would then be read, 
when asserted, as claiming that NA, NB and NC respectively are among that totality but as 
claiming nothing else whatever about what else is or is not. More modestly still N could just 
be the totality of normative attitudes expressly endorsed in a given context of logical 
evaluation. In the impure version NO is of course uniform throughout. But to stop it looking 
trivial I have only explicitly represented NO as mandating the premises, not the conclusion. 
Naturally if it mandates the former it had better mandate the latter. But again only if it itself is 
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subject to consistency constraints that, at risk of labouring the point, are not credibly fully 
µRIIORDGDEOH¶. 12 
 One might still favour a form of very minimal ecumenicalism which removed the 
brackets from the representational elements in PURE MP, took them as core components of 
the pure argument and insisted that they are constituent parts of the relevant normative 
judgements. But now that seems pointless. The connection between the representational and 
nonrepresentational elements has tightened to the point of triviality. The representational 
elements just retell, in representational mode, what the nonrepresentational elements divulge. 
They illuminate the logical connections between the latter but, once they have done that, that 
is all they are needed for.  
 I think the sort of ecumenical view defended by Ridge is vulnerable to a nasty 
dilemma. The more we understand his talk of normative perspectives expansively the more 
extraneous content we build into normative judgements and the more we will encounter the 
kind of headaches discussed above over disagreement and agnosticism. The more we avoid 
                                                          
12
 Someone might object: but of course anyone who accepts the premises of IMPURE MP 
has to accept the conclusion. Because the premises include Eating meat is NO-forbidden and 
If eating meat is NO-forbidden, then eating beef is NO-forbidden. If these two things are true 
then it must be true that Eating beef is NO-forbidden, So NO, the outlook in question, must 
indeed include H!(standards that forbid eating beef). For if it did not Eating beef is NO-
forbidden, which is supposed to be simply a description of NO, would be false, and it cannot, 
by modus ponensEHIDOVHLIRXUGHVFULSWLYHSUHPLVHVDUHWUXH6RRXUUHDVRQHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH
LVJXDUDQWHHGWRVDWLVI\WKLVGHVFULSWLRQDQGZHGRQ¶WQHHGDQ\WKLQJOLNHWKHILQDOVWHS
represented by the N-SULQFLSOHDIWHUDOO,WKLQNLWLVLQVWUXFWLYHWRVHHZK\WKLVLVQ¶WULJKW,
think when we attribute to our reasoner the thought If eating meat is NO-forbidden, then 
eating beef is NO-forbidden we are really not entitled to take this to be simply a description 
of their normative outlook. Rather we must see it as something somewhat more aspirational 
than that, the outlook they aspire to have, their outlook suitably idealised by the standards 
that are internal to it. Remember we are trying to represent the normative outlook of someone 
who is committed to not accepting moral standards which do not simultaneously forbid eating 
meat but fail to forbid eating beef. But it is one thing to be committed to not being like that, 
another thing to not be like that. The description  that I must trivially satisfy just in virtue of 
such a commitment is that I have some thought of the sort I sought to capture by the 
expression: H! (Standards that do not forbid eating meat and fail to forbid eating beef). But I 
am not, in virtue of that, logically guaranteed to satisfy the description that: if I think H! 
(Standards that forbid eating meat) then I think H! (Standards that forbid eating beef). 
(Observe the crucial way the H! distributes across the latter conditional but which thus fails 
in equivalence to the former thought where the H! has wide scope.) Of course a kind of 
coherence may demand this as a normative matter. But logic does not dictate that if someone 
thinks H! (Standards that do not forbid eating meat and do not forbid eating beef), then if 
they think H! (Standards that forbid eating meat) they must think H! (Standards that forbid 
eating beef. Just as if I think H!(Being nice to cats) then a kind of coherence demands that I 
am nice to cats but the thing is not, alas, logically guaranteed.  
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this by understanding normative perspectives narrowly, the clearer it gets that we lose 
nothing by ditching the ecumenical turn and staying pure. 
 Ridge will still, I suspect, want to disagree.  He will want to insist, that the sort of 
story he tells is better than the sort of story Gibbard tells because of Schroeder¶s objection to 
Gibbard: 
:KDWLW>*LEEDUG¶VDFFRXQW@LVUHDOO\VD\LQJLVPHUHO\WKDWµPXUGHU LVQRWZURQJ¶PXVW
express a mental state that is inconsistent with all and only the hyperdecided mental 
VWDWHVWKDWµPXUGHULVZURQJ¶LVQRWLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK$QGDJDLQWKDWORRNVPRUHOLNH
a list of criteria WKDWZHKRSHWKHDWWLWXGHH[SUHVVHGE\µPXrGHULVQRWZURQJ¶ZLOO
satisfy, in lieu of a concrete story about which mental state this actually is, and why it 
turns out to be inconsistent with the right mental states.13  
,ZRQ¶WGLVFXVs this concern in detail here except to note WKDW6FKURHGHU¶VFULWLTXHRI*Lbbard 
has been the target of some rather telling discussion by Derek Baker and Jack Woods in a 
recent paper in Ethics and by Gibbard himself in an appendix to his recent Meaning and 
Normativity.14 Gibbard¶VDFFRXQWRIQRUPDWLYHPHDQLQJWDNHVWKHQRWLRQRIGLVDJUHHPHQWDV
an unexplained primitive but all semantic theories unavoidably take some notions as 
comparably primitive and there seems no compelling reason to suppose GLEEDUG¶V
distinctively at fault unless perhaps we follow Schroeder in supposing there to be something 
somehow disreputable about what he called B-type inconsistency where that is inconsistency 
not explained by a single attitude towards inconsistent contents. Baker and Woods, as well as 
Gibbard cast considerable doubt on this supposition noting that there are in fact numerous 
theoretical domains where B-type inconsistency plays a pervasive and important role.  
,KDYHIRFXVHGDERYHRQZKDWDUHSHUKDSVWKHFRUHFODLPVRI5LGJH¶VERRN 
constituting his distinctive version of expressivism. I have said nothing about the magisterial 
FULWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQRIULYDOYLHZVLQFKDSWHUVDQG,UHDOO\GRQ¶WILQGPXFKKHUHWRGLVDJUHH
about. Nor have I discussed the richly interesting final chapter 8, which, surprisingly in the 
light of what has come before, defends a reductive cognitivist account of practical rationality. 
An adequate discussion of this would make this review much longer and it is already long 
enough. 6R,¶OOVWRSKHUH 
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